

Supplementary Materials for: “Enemies Within: Interactions Between Terrorists and Democracies”

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A Appendix

Controls for Models 4-6

This first section of the supplementary materials contains the point estimates and standard errors for the control variables used in Models 4-6. These were suppressed in the main text to conserve space and are presented in Table 1.

Selection concerns

In this part of the analysis, I use the country-year as the unit of analysis. The data in Models 1 and 2 are from Young and Dugan (2011) and Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2011), respectively and both explicitly look at just domestic terrorism; the data in Model 3 all GTD attacks to the country-year level. The main advantage of the country-year approach is that it avoids selection issues because it includes cases without terrorist groups.

In the first set of results, shown in Table 2, I find that terrorist groups attack more when right-wing parties hold office using three different datasets. All three country-year data sources produce the same results. Many of the other variables have the same sign and magnitude across all three models.

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Table 1: Control variables for Models 4-6

	Terrorist Attacks		
	Non-leftist groups	Group ideology	Weak groups
	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Center	-0.78* (0.32)	-0.43 [†] (0.25)	-0.45* (0.22)
Pop.	0.25 [†] (0.14)	0.04 (0.13)	0.02 (0.10)
Mil. Per. per capita	-5.85* (2.37)	-4.09* (1.67)	-4.66** (1.34)
GDP per Capita	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Polity2	-0.19 (0.19)	0.02 (0.11)	0.01 (0.10)
PR	-1.87** (0.52)	-1.58** (0.55)	-1.56** (0.30)
Gov't Frac.	-0.76* (0.39)	-0.45 (0.32)	-0.47 (0.30)
Lagged Attacks	0.04** (0.00)	0.03** (0.00)	0.03** (0.00)
Free Press	-0.13 (0.23)	0.32 (0.21)	0.38* (0.17)
GDP Growth	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Eth. Frac.	-8.00** (0.88)	-4.30** (0.95)	-4.45** (0.58)
Rel. Frac	-1.14 (0.85)	0.77 (0.78)	0.43 (0.97)
Cold War	-0.07 (0.23)	-0.18 (0.18)	-0.19 (0.17)
Territorial	0.29 (0.69)	0.67 (0.64)	0.37 (0.32)
2nd Terror Group	1.43** (0.30)	0.16 (0.28)	0.22 (0.26)
Duration	0.02 (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
Duration ²	0.00 [†] (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
Intercept	-8.32 (5.09)	-6.41 [†] (3.65)	-6.87* (3.03)
α	2.61	2.72	2.74
Log L	-1293.20	-2162.02	-2164.50
N	563	793	793

Notes: ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; [†] $p < 0.1$

Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses

Table 2: Country-year approach

	Terrorist Attacks		
	Young and Dugan Model 16	Enders and Sandler Model 17	All GTD Model 18
Left	-0.54** (0.19)	-0.40** (0.13)	-0.45** (0.12)
Center	0.17 (0.26)	0.42* (0.21)	0.26† (0.15)
Pop.	1.03** (0.09)	0.87** (0.04)	0.77** (0.03)
Mil. Per. per capita	12.05** (1.40)	10.09** (0.99)	8.93** (1.00)
GDP per Capita	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.04** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Polity2	-0.24** (0.07)	-0.09† (0.05)	-0.14** (0.05)
PR	-0.31† (0.17)	-0.24 (0.15)	0.04 (0.09)
Gov't Frac.	-0.14 (0.33)	-0.17 (0.31)	-0.30 (0.26)
Lagged Attacks	0.03** (0.00)	0.02** (0.00)	0.02** (0.00)
Free Press	0.43 (0.33)	0.22 (0.28)	0.09 (0.20)
GDP Growth	0.03* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Eth. Frac.	0.21 (0.41)	-0.01 (0.22)	-0.36 (0.22)
Rel. Frac	-2.38** (0.37)	-1.71** (0.30)	-1.24** (0.23)
Cold War	0.31** (0.05)	-0.11 (0.22)	0.16 (0.19)
Intercept	20.33** (3.07)	17.48** (2.29)	15.67** (2.16)
α	1.98	4.13	2.58
Log L	-1808.77	-2430.41	-2577.99
N	969	969	969

Notes: ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; † $p < 0.1$

Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses

Additional Robustness Checks

This section of the supplementary material contains the remaining robustness checks these results are presented in Table 3.

Table 3 examines the inclusion of fixed effects. Note that the dispersion parameter α is not estimated for fixed-effects models. The first two models use the fixed-effects negative binomial on the dyadic data with dyad fixed effects. This approach is more general than a country-fixed effects model as it allows the baseline level of attacks to vary by dyads within countries rather constraining all conflicts within a country to share the same baseline. Model 30 also uses dyadic fixed effect but includes year dummies as well. Model 31 differs from the other two by using a hierarchical linear model with logged attacks (plus one) as the dependent variable. The mixed-effects approach allows for random intercepts at both the country and dyad level. These three models place different structures on the data and provide reasonable checks on the main results. All three models continue to find support for the hypothesis that terrorist groups are attacking more when right-wing parties are in control. These findings support the main results from the main text and provide additional confidence that the above models are uncovering a real effect.

In Models 23-25, the concern is that India and Israel exert undue influence on the results because these two countries are involved in substantially more dyadic terrorist conflicts than other countries. To account for this I include specific dummies for each country, as well as a model where I include both dummies and run a negative binomial with all attacks as the dependent variable. The results I find roughly match those in the main text, providing confidence that neither of these countries is driving the main results. Finally, Model 26 models the decision to engage in any terrorism separately from the amount of terrorism to commit by using a zero-inflated negative binomial. The first-stage results are omitted, but we see that, on average, more attacks still occur during right-wing rule.

About UCDP Data

This appendix looks at some of the benefits and drawbacks with using the UCDP data to construct the dyadic data. I also detail the changes I make to the UCDP data that make it a

Table 3: Additional Robustness checks

	Dyad FE Model 19	Dyad FE & Year Dummies Model 20	Multilevel OLS Model 21	Gov't Frac Interaction Model 22	Israel Model 23	India Model 24	Israel & India Model 25	Zero Inflated Model 26
Left	-0.35* (0.14)	-0.31 [†] (0.16)	-0.18* (0.09)	-0.41 [†] (0.24)	-0.50** (0.16)	-0.41** (0.16)	-0.41* (0.16)	-0.29 [†] (0.16)
Center	0.07 (0.10)	0.03 (0.10)	-0.75** (0.15)	-0.33 (0.22)	-0.37 [†] (0.21)	-0.38 [†] (0.23)	-0.52* (0.23)	-0.41* (0.19)
Pop.	-1.14 (0.97)	-1.37 (1.14)	0.56* (0.23)	0.08 (0.07)	0.12 (0.08)	0.33** (0.09)	0.66** (0.11)	0.04 (0.10)
Mil. Per. pc	-0.06** (0.01)	-0.07** (0.02)	-1.69 (1.42)	-2.76** (0.98)	-3.74* (1.61)	-2.12* (0.98)	-4.97** (1.78)	-2.59 [†] (1.43)
GDP pc	0.30** (0.07)	0.31** (0.07)	-0.13** (0.03)	-0.03 [†] (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.04** (0.01)	-0.05 [†] (0.03)
Polity2	-0.78** (0.19)	-1.11** (0.23)	0.18* (0.07)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)
PR	0.62** (0.21)	0.79** (0.23)	-1.16** (0.24)	-1.37** (0.27)	-1.57** (0.34)	-1.03** (0.26)	-1.53** (0.30)	-1.44* (0.58)
Gov't Frac.	0.01** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.21 (0.18)	-0.17 (0.33)	-0.40 (0.28)	-0.04 (0.25)	-0.25 (0.28)	-0.49 (0.32)
Lagged Attacks	0.32* (0.13)	0.13 (0.16)	0.01** (0.00)	0.03** (0.00)	0.03** (0.00)	0.03** (0.00)	0.03** (0.00)	0.02** (0.00)
Free Press	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.22* (0.11)	0.39* (0.17)	0.34* (0.16)	0.50** (0.15)	0.32* (0.15)	0.40 [†] (0.23)
GDP Growth	-2.68** (0.46)	-3.02** (0.52)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Ethnic Frac.	0.19 (0.68)	-0.27 (0.73)	-5.90** (1.65)	-3.97** (0.47)	-4.36** (0.55)	-3.22** (0.48)	-4.02** (0.51)	-3.72** (1.05)
Rel. Frac.	-0.34* (0.13)	-1.56** (0.53)	1.72 (2.16)	-0.69 (0.53)	-0.93 (0.57)	-0.41 (0.52)	-1.08 [†] (0.57)	-0.36 (0.40)
Cold War	-4.46* (1.97)	-3.88 (2.42)	-0.16 (0.12)	-0.23 (0.17)	-0.22 (0.15)	-0.15 (0.16)	0.00 (0.17)	-0.12 (0.20)
Left × Gov't Frac.								
Israel					0.59 (0.69)		2.08** (0.74)	
India						-1.19** (0.36)	-2.17** (0.38)	
Intercept	-0.31** (0.12)	-0.27* (0.12)	-6.01 [†] (3.23)	-2.02 (2.30)	-4.19 (3.45)	-3.37 (2.24)	-12.08** (4.13)	-1.19 (3.29)
α				2.87 802	2.87 802	2.85 802	2.82 802	1.59 802
Log L	-1757.70 749	-1732.25 749	-1139.15 802	-2198.66 802	-2198.35 802	-2196.52 802	-2193.18 802	-2076.35 802

Notes: ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; [†] $p < 0.1$
Models 19-21 standard errors in parenthesis, Models 22-26 PCSE in parenthesis. In Model 21, the dependent variables is logged attacks plus one.

Table 4: Countries in Data

Country	Number of Conflicts in Data
Argentina	2
Bangladesh	1
Colombia	4
El Salvador	1
Georgia	1
India	16
Indonesia	1
Israel	9
Macedonia	1
Mali	2
Nicaragua	1
Niger	4
Pakistan	3
Peru	2
Philippines	4
Russia (Soviet Union)	1
Senegal	1
Spain	1
Sri Lanka	2
Sudan	1
Thailand	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Turkey	3
United Kingdom	2
Venezuela	1

better fit for this project.

The major drawback is that UCDP’s inclusion requirement of at least 25 battle deaths in a given year means that I am almost certainly dropping whole cases that should be included in the data. Likewise, it means that I am missing years within cases where terrorist attacks occurred, but they did not result in 25 battle deaths. While there is an easy solution to the later of these two problems, the former presents a more difficult challenge.

To address the problem of years within identified conflicts I use data from Jones and Libicki and the Terrorist Organization Profiles dataset (TOPs) to establish start and end dates for each group that I identify using the UCDP Dyadic Data (Jones and Libicki 2008). I expand the UCDP cases to include all the years that the group is listed as active.

The problem of dyads that are not included in UCDP is a larger problem. The only way to

solve this problem is to manually check each of the 2,848 groups in the GTD and code them as being either domestic or transnational terrorist groups. The enormity of this task has forced me to accept the UCDP solution. One advantage of using this filtering mechanism is that it eliminates one-and-done groups and lone-wolf attackers.

It is worth noting that there are groups in UCDP that are not included in my dataset. These groups include insurgent groups that do not seem to use terrorism and coups. An example of an insurgent group that does not appear in the GTD is the military force of Transnistria (Moldova). In general, UCDP is a second best solution to these concerns, but the effort required to manually code groups is prohibitive. However, this solution does have some benefits. UCDP provides a set of groups that are unambiguously domestic terrorist groups. It also allows me to use conflict specific data for each dyad, such as group goals, conflict life cycle, and other relevant variables that should matter in interactions between particular terrorist groups and state governments. Table 4 shows a complete list of the countries that are included in the UCDP data and the number of dyads that the country is involved in over the course of dataset.

References

- Enders, W., T. Sandler, and K. Gaibullov. 2011. "Domestic versus transnational terrorism: Data, decomposition, and dynamics." *Journal of Peace Research* (48)3: 319–337.
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